I’ve been considering writing a reflective piece about the general quality of bioethics papers in medical journals, focusing on how the medium (the audience and the severe word limits) impacts on the message and its quality – possibly as a bit of a moan since I’ve not yet managed to get a medical journal to accept one of my papers (my favourite rejection from an editor yet being “nice try, but too philosophical – maybe try the journal of medical ethics?”). Furthermore publication pressures tend to select for particular styles of pieces – I’ve remarked to people in the past that the way to get published in the BMJ is to write a piece critical of research ethics review – preferably with an anecdote Then this morning on twitter I saw this lovely funny piece by James Lenman of the University of Sheffield on how to write a crap essay in philosophy which contains gems such as:
“Whenever in any doubt as to what to say about X, say, apropos of nothing in particular and without explanation, that X is extremely subjective.
When that gets boring, try saying that X is all very relative. Never say what it is relative to.”
And I decided to just borrow and extend the idea in this piece. So take James’ rules as given and add these rules to enable the reader to write a crap piece of work in bioethics:
1. Unreflectively copy a piece of work by a philosopher. If they wasted time qualifying their view or noting it only applies in a limited situation make sure you strip that out.
2. Remember if you are a doctor you don’t need good arguments – you have authority… Remember if you are a philosopher you don’t need to know the context to write authoritatively about it.
3. Never use an argument where an anecdote will do. A homily is worth a thousand arguments.
4. Instead of making an argument, say “I will argue”. Then don’t, an assertion will do. No one will notice.
5. Don’t ever make a modest claim when you can make a bold assertion. Only extremes can be correct.
6. According to the OED it is important to define your terms using the dictionary not how they have been defined in the relevant literature.
7. Please do begin your paper with a vaguely relevant quote from “Literature” this shows that you are well read and thus quite clearly correct. As D’Israeli said: “The wisdom of the wise, and the experience of ages, may be preserved by quotation.”
8. If empirical evidence is relevant to your paper make sure you either don’t find any or you just run a google search and then cherry pick the evidence to support your case without considering its quality.
9. Remember the is/ought problem is a philosophical problem not a bioethical problem so you don’t need to worry about it when making grand assertions from tiny bits of empirical evidence.
10. Ad hominem is a valid argument structure.
11. All slopes are slippery. If its bad and it is remotely possible let us assume that it will happen.
12. There are no principles/theories but the four principles.
13. Obviously the four principles approach is the only one worth considering. Make sure you refer to all four principles (but nothing other than them) especially if several of the principles are irrelevant to the situation you are discussing – before concluding that autonomy trumps the others.
14. Remember the more arguments/assertions you can give the better – why waste time on critical reflection and depth when you can squeeze in more arguments/assertions. Especially ensure that there is no methodological or theoretical consistency about the position you advance.
15. If your argument gets into trouble you can save it by referring to Nazi Germany and implying that your opponents view would have been looked on kindly there.
Please suggest more rules in the comments…
The past two decades have seen the rise of contrastivist positions in several areas of philosophy. For example, a recent turn in the debate about the nature of causation has been to think of causation as contrastive; that is, to hold that binary causal claims need to be relativized to implicit contrasts. Relatedly, a contrastive conception of knowledge has been steadily emerging. According to this view, there is a sense in which I have ordinary knowledge of the world around me, in that I do know that I am holding a coffee cup rather than a wine glass, but there is also a sense in which the sceptic is correct in claiming that I cannot rule out possibilities of error, such that I don’t know that I am holding a coffee cup rather than merely dreaming. Thus this contrastive view claims to explain how ordinary knowledge and sceptical doubt are compatible. Finally, one can also adopt a contrastivist view in the philosophy of language, according to which language is guided by implicit ‘questions under discussion’. This idea – that the structure of language can be cashed out in terms of question-and-answer inquiry – is radically new, and offers unique solutions to familiar puzzles of language.
This class is divided into four sections, each of which focuses on four areas in theoretical philosophy where contrastivist approaches have begun to flourish: in debates about (i) explanation, (ii) knowledge, (iii) causation, and (iv) metaphysical grounding.
Upon completion of this course, students will be well-versed in each of these debates (and thereby able to begin independent research in these areas), but will also have the requisite background to fruitfully participate in the upcoming Fifth Hamburg Summer School, led by Professor Jonathan Schaffer.
Regarding writing philosophy papers, I strongly suggest the following:
Further, the following German texts – all written by Christian Folde – are all useful: